Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement

Under Superfund
James P. Youngt

A young congressman named David Stockman rose to the floor
of the House of Representatives on September 23, 1980, to oppose
the creation of a "Superfund" that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would use to clean up the nation's hazardous waste
dumps. He challenged the proponents of Superfund to present information showing why "this one problem, of all the problems we
face in this country today, could not be handled by the states if we
give them some encouragement. [The Congress and the EPA] cannot do everything."' Representative John LaFalce answered Stockman's challenge, claiming that "[s]tates cannot handle" hazardous
waste cleanup because "it is a problem that is nationwide in scope
and is deserving of a comprehensive legal framework." 2
Although hazardous waste is a "nationwide" problem in the
sense that every state contains hazardous waste sites, it is not nationwide in the sense usually associated with environmental harms;
that is, hazardous waste is not a problem that routinely transcends
the boundaries of a single state. Representative LaFalce's comments hid the real source of congressional discontent: the states
had failed to respond to the problem. 3 Whatever Congress's motivation, Stockman was defeated, and Congress subsequently created
the Superfund under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).
Although the EPA has cleaned thousands of hazardous waste
sites-largely by itself-in the decade since Congress passed

t B.A. 1987, University of Florida; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
1 126 Cong Rec 26765 (September 23, 1980). Stockman noted that the committee report's treatment of "[e]vidence of inadequate local and State response" contained only three
cases: "one which occurred 7 years ago; another of them which could not occur now under
(the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976] and the third one was Love Canal."
2 Id.
3 For an example of this view, see id at 26760-61 (remarks of Rep. Florio) ("Many
states, quite frankly, are not interested or are not capable of going forward. And they do
not want to.").
4 Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), codified at 42 USC §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp
1989).
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CERCLA, this represents only a small fraction of the sites that will
eventually need attention under the statutory program.5 As of this
writing, the EPA has placed over 1,175 sites on its "National Priorities List,"6 yet the agency has begun cleanup operations at only
254 of those sites, 7 and government officials estimate that the EPA
may eventually be called upon to clean up at least 10,000 sites.8
Congress authorized $8.5 billion for hazardous waste cleanup between 1986 and 1991, but the cost may ultimately exceed $100
billion.9
From the beginning, Congress envisioned a secondary, supporting role for the states in performing cleanups. In CERCLA,
Congress concentrated power in the federal government, even
though most of the economic rationales underlying centralization
in environmental regulation-for example, externalities among
states or economies of scale from concerted interstate action 0 -are
not present in hazardous waste cleanup. Most Superfund sites are
located within a single state that could handle the cleanup on its
own, and some evidence suggests that state governments are interested in taking more control of cleanup actions within their borders. States are better positioned to respond to local concerns than
the EPA, which is only indirectly politically accountable to local
communities.
This Comment proposes that Congress adopt two structural
changes to CERCLA. First, states should control initiation and implemention of hazardous waste cleanups. This recommendation
comports with principles of federalism and enhances political accountability. Second, states should have the right to seek federal
injunctions against polluters, just as the federal government now
can under CERCLA. 1" The government's right to obtain injunctive
relief complements its power to initiate cleanups. Most importantly, the government can achieve cleanups more cheaply and

8

See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Doc No OTA-ITE-232, Superfund

Strategy 3 (1985).
See note 20 and accompanying text.
BNA Envir Daily 4 (October 31, 1989).
8OTA, Superfund Strategy at 3 (cited in note 5).
'Id.
10 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J 1196, 1212, 121516 (1977).
21 42 USC § 9606(a). In practice, this provision has allowed the federal government to
obtain injunctive relief. See, for example, B. F. Goodrich v Murtha, 697 F Supp 89 (D Conn
1988).
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quickly through injunctions than if it had to undertake them itself
and later sue for reimbursement.
Section I of this Comment sets forth the general structure of
CERCLA and describes the balance of power between the federal
government and the states under the current CERCLA scheme.
Section II provides an introduction to the array of state "miniSuperfund" statutes and their uneasy coexistence with CERCLA.
Section III analyzes some of the policy problems that arise from
the current system, especially in light of federalism principles. Section IV presents a proposal to improve the process of hazardous
waste cleanup.

I.
A.

THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER

CERCLA

The General Structure of CERCLA

In 1979, the evacuation at Love Canal in New York drew national attention to the problem of hazardous waste sites and increased pressure on Congress to pass legislation concerning
cleanup procedures. I2 The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA)'3 already provided "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous wastes, but RCRA's considerable federal enforcement power did not extend to waste dumps created before the enactment of the statute.1 4 In the final days of the 1980 congressional
term, Congress passed CERCLA. The statute imposed taxes on the
chemical industry to fund the Hazardous Substance Superfund
(the "Superfund"), which would finance EPA cleanups of hazardous waste sites.'5 CERCLA also established, in general terms, the
procedures and standards to be followed in carrying out the
cleanups.
The original version of CERCLA was the product of a hastily
worked-out compromise. It was passed with almost no debate and

"

Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum J Envir L 1, 7-8
(1982). See generally Samuel S. Epstein, Lester 0. Brown, and Carl Pope, Hazardous Waste
in America (Sierra Club, 1982).
13 Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 (1976), codified as an amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 USC §§ 6901-6992k (1982 & Supp 1989).
",42 USC § 6973. See also Donald W. Stever, 1 Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste §§ 6.03-6.05 (Clark Boardman, 1989); and Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 109
S Ct 2273, 2285 (1989).
16 See Grad, 8 Colum J Envir L at 1 (cited in note 12).
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under a suspension of the rules.' 6 As a result of this unorthodox
process, the drafters of CERCLA gave insufficient thought to such
basic features of the statute as the liability rules and the mechanics of implementation. 1 Therefore, Congress tried to correct these
problems when it reauthorized money for the Superfund under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA).' 8 Substantive changes in CERCLA included setting deadlines for the EPA on cleanups, specifying settlement policy, and
ensuring defendants' right to contribution. Congress also increased
the 1986-1991 Superfund authorization to $8.5 billion.
As amended, CERCLA contains several major provisions governing the orderly cleanup of hazardous waste sites. It requires the
President to revise the National Contingency Plan to "establish
procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous
substances."' 19 CERCLA also authorizes the EPA to investigate
sites, and requires the agency to compile a National Priorities
List2 ° of sites that present the greatest danger.2 ' The EPA can use
the Superfund to finance "remedial actions,"2 2 defined as "those
actions consistent with permanent remedy [sic] taken instead of or
in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment. ' ' 23 Remedial actions include site-specific actions such as
"storage, confinement,... neutralization, cleanup..., recycling or
reuse, repair or replacement of containers, ... incineration"; they
also include relocation of residents and offsite transport and storage.24 The EPA may then sue polluters for reimbursement of the
Grad, 8 Colum J Envir L at 1 (cited in note 12).
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford HarborProceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F Supp 22, 25-26 n 2 (D Mass 1987).
2' Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986), codified as an amendment to CERCLA, 42
USC §§ 9601-9675.
19 42 USC § 9605(a). The President, in turn, has delegated this task, along with most of
his authority under CERCLA, to the EPA. See id. The National Contingency Plan already
existed as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now called the Clean Water
Act), 33 USC §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp 1989). The Plan's official name is the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, and is described at 40 CFR § 300
(1989). Before CERCLA, the National Contingency Plan served as a blueprint for dealing
with environmental disasters such as oil spills. See Joseph Freedman, Proposed Amendments to the National Contingency Plan: Explanation and Analysis, 19 Envir L Repr
10105, 10105-07 (1989).
20 The National Priorities List is found at 40 CFR § 300, Appendix B (1989).
22 42 USC § 9605.
22 Remedial actions are confined to sites that appear on the National Priorities List. 40
CFR § 300.68(a)(1) (1986).
23 42 USC § 9601(24) (emphasis added).
17 See

24

Id.
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costs of the remedial action." Liability under CERCLA is strict,
joint, and several. 6
Other key provisions of CERCLA deal with emergency situations. When the EPA concludes that a hazardous waste site requires a quick response, it can undertake a "removal,

27

which is

defined simply as "the cleanup or removal of released hazardous
substances from the environment.

'28

In addition, when the Presi-

dent believes that a certain site presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment," he can require the Attorney General to file an action for
federal injunctive relief to abate the danger.29 SARA also clarifies
the government's power to reach settlements with offenders, requiring that all settlements involving remedial actions be entered
as consent decrees.30
B.

The State's Role in CERCLA

This subsection explores the several provisions of CERCLA
that delineate permissible state involvement in federal Superfund
operations. 1 The paradigmatic case under CERCLA involves an
action initiated by the EPA, with limited state involvement confined to certain points in the cleanup process. In addition, however, states may recover some of their own response costs under
CERCLA, to the extent that the state action is consistent with the
National Contingency Plan,32 or if the state is protecting its natural resources.3 3

25

42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(A).

See 42 USC § 9607. While the statute does not specify the standard of liability,
courts have concluded that liability is strict, joint, and several. See, for example, United
States v Monsanto, 858 F2d 160, 166-68 (4th Cir 1988); and United States v Conservation
Chemical Co., 628 F Supp 391, 417-20 (W D Mo 1985), as supplemented Jan 9, 1986.
27 42 USC § 9604(a).
28 42 USC § 9601(23). A removal differs from a remedial action in that the EPA may
not spend more than two million dollars or twelve months on a removal. 42 USC
28

§ 9604(c)(1).
29 42 USC § 9606(a).
3- 42 USC § 9622(d)(1)(A). This provision of SARA was added to remedy the perception that the EPA had entered a number of "sweetheart deals" with potentially responsible
parties. For an example of such a deal, see United States v Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F
Supp 1334 (SD Ind 1982). Congress intended the consent decree requirement to provide
independent judicial oversight. See Comment, Consent Decrees Under the Superfund
Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986: Controlling Discretion With Procedure,
1987 U Chi Legal F 451, 452-55.
31 See 42 USC §§
9604, 9605(a)(8)(B), 9621(f).
32 42 USC § 9607(a).
33 42 USC § 9607(f).
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When the federal government responds first.

In the typical remedial action contemplated by CERCLA, the
EPA identifies, investigates, analyzes, and cleans up the hazardous
waste site. The states have a significant, if secondary, role in this
process: states must submit suggestions for sites to be included on
the National Priorities List,34 and must be permitted "substantial
and meaningful involvement" in the "initiation, development, and
selection of remedial actions" within the state.3 5 In addition, the
EPA cannot spend Superfund money without securing an agreement from the affected state to pay at least ten percent of the cost
of the remedial action;36 the affected state must also agree to maintain the site in the future and to provide a federally-approved disposal facility for the wastes removed. 7
CERCLA's displacement of the states in the cleanup process
creates potential sources of friction between the federal and state
governments. For example, if the EPA decides to undertake a remedial action, the state may apply to the EPA to participate in or
to perform the action itself, but the decision lies wholly with the
EPA.3 8 Although the EPA may want states to assume a larger role
in the cleanups, it seems to doubt that they will do an acceptable
job. 9 Another potential source of friction is the EPA's power to
propose remedies during settlement talks even when the remedies
do not meet state standards; federal courts are not bound to honor
a state's request that its standards be followed.40 Once the EPA
decides tb clean up a site, these structural and institutional biases
often result in the states being sidelined during the cleanup
process.
2.

When the state responds first under CERCLA.

Because CERCLA delegates substantial authority to a federal
agency, it is usually the federal government and not the states that
initiates cleanup measures. Nevertheless, there are two opportunities under CERCLA itself for a state to recover the costs of a
cleanup. First, the general liability section, 42 USC § 9607, allows
34 42 USC § 9605(a)(8)(B).
35 42 USC § 9621(f)(1).
31 42 USC § 9604(c)(3)(C).
37 42 USC § 9604(c)(3)(B).
42 USC § 9604(a). See also Freedman, 19 Envir L Repr at 10135 (cited in note 19).
" See Freedman, 19 Envir L Repr at 10116 (cited in note 19).
40 42 USC § 9621(f). For examples of state standards, see Section H; for examples of
how this friction plays out, see Section I.
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"persons," which includes states,41 to recover response costs from
cleanups that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan.42
Second, each state is made the trustee of the natural resources in
that state (unless they are controlled by the federal government)
and is entitled to sue polluters who destroy those natural resources. 43 States may act under federal law pursuant only to these
provisions. CERCLA does not, however, prevent states from using
their own laws to cleanup sites on the National Priorities List.44
The right to sue polluters directly for injunctive relief under
CERCLA, as the federal government can under § 9606, would give
the states a powerful enforcement tool. The economizing feature of
injunctions would mitigate the cost of cleaning the large number of
sites that need attention within a reasonable time frame.45 Since
the only costs the government must bear up front when bringing a
suit for an injunction are the costs of maintaining the action, a
state could initiate more cleanups at one time. Therefore, expanding the power of the states to obtain injunctions in federal
court should result in more sites being cleaned up more quickly.
The question whether states in fact possess such a right has
been hotly debated. As part of SARA, Congress added the following provision to CERCLA: "A State may enforce any Federal or
State standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the remedial action is required to conform under this Act in the United
States district court for the district in which the facility is located. ' ' 48 Although this provision appears at first blush to authorize
states to initiate actions for injunctive relief, an examination of
42 USC § 9601(21).
4' The EPA has set out guidelines for state compliance with the National Contingency
Plan in cleanups not involving the federal government. For example, when undertaking a
remedial action, the state must satisfy the Plan's provisions relating to remedial investigations, cost-effective responses, and opportunity for public comment. Prior approval of the
EPA, however, is not required. See generally 40 CFR § 300.71 (1989); see also State of New
York v Shore Realty Corp., 759 F2d 1032, 1045-47 (2d Cir 1985).
43 The state can recover damages, which must be used to "restore, replace, or acquire
the equivalent of such natural resources." 42 USC § 9607(f)(1). See also Idaho v Hanna
Mining Company, 882 F2d 392 (9th Cir 1989).
44 See 42 USC § 9614(a); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
HR Rep No 962, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 248 (1986), reprinted in 5 USCCAN 3276, 3341.
4" For the projected costs of the Superfund program, see OTA, Superfund Strategy at 7
41

(cited in note 5).
46 42 USC § 9621(e)(2). The statute goes on to provide, "Any consent decree shall re-

quire the parties to attempt expeditiously to resolve disagreements concerning the implementation of the remedial action informally with the appropriate Federal and State agencies. Where the parties agree, the consent decree may provide for administrative
enforcement."

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:985

CERCLA's structure and legislative history suggests that, in fact,
it does not so empower the states.
The two courts that have addressed this issue have reached
opposite conclusions. In Colorado v Idarado Mining Co.,47 the district court in Colorado held, without analysis, that CERCLA's
state enforcement provision (§ 9621(e)(2)) allows states to sue for
injunctions against polluters in federal court, even if the federal
government has taken no action with respect to that site. Conversely, in United States v Akzo Coatings of America, Inc.,48 a district court in Michigan held that § 9621(e)(2) allows states to sue
for injunctions only to enforce the provisions of existing consent
decrees.
Three reasons suggest that the Idarado court incorrectly interpreted § 9621(e)(2). First, the court resorted to a plain meaning
argument, simply quoting the sentence about safe enforcement and
stating, "Thus injunctive relief is also available to the state under
CERCLA. ' '49 But this argument ignores the larger statutory context of § 9621(e)(2). The state enforcement provision applies only
to "remedial action[s] selected under section [9604] or secured
under section [9606]. ' '50 Those sections of CERCLA authorize only
the federal government to initiate Superfund projects, not the
states.51
Second, the immediate context of the provision strongly suggests that the grant of enforcement power to the states is confined
to existing consent decrees. The phrase immediately following the
grant of enforcement power in § 9621(e)(2)-"Any consent decree
shall require"-suggests that the previous sentence refers only to
situations in which a consent decree exists. It is unlikely that Congress intended an isolated sentence to create a broad new stateinitiated remedial action, especially since the President himself
may sue for injunctions only when the hazardous waste poses an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to public health." 2
Third, the legislative history of the provision argues convincingly against broad remedial powers for the states. The House Report explains the purpose of § 9621(e)(2) as follows: "States are
given the authority to enforce requirements of consent decrees to
707 F Supp 1227, 1232 (D Colo 1989).
719 F Supp 571, 577-80 (E D Mich 1989).
"' Idarado, 707 F Supp at 1232.
50 42 USC § 9621(d)(2).
51 See, for example, Cadillac Fairview/Californiav Dow Chemical Co., 840 F2d 691,
697 (9th Cir 1988).
52 42 USC § 9606(a).
"7

48
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which the remedial action must conform." 53 Although the actual
language of § 9621(e)(2) is not clear on its face, the best reading of
the statute appears to limit state enforcement power to existing
consent decrees.
II.

STATE RESPONSES UNDER STATE LAW

As noted earlier, the drafters of CERCLA hoped to fill the
void created by the states' inability or unwillingness to address
hazardous waste cleanup.5 4 At the same time they sought to centralize federal control over cleanup actions, however, the drafters
wanted the states to assume a large portion of the burdens CERCLA would impose, both in terms of money and resources. A potential conflict thus arose: as states passed legislation and developed infrastructures to meet their financial responsibilities under
CERCLA, they inevitably sought greater control over hazardous
waste cleanup.
CERCLA originally required states to contribute money to
each remedial action, 5 but simultaneously withheld control from
the states by forbidding them from using state tax dollars to pay
"compensation for claims for any costs of response or damage or
claims which may be compensated under this title. 5 6 The Supreme Court ruled in Exxon Corp. v Hunt57 that this CERCLA
provision (§ 9614(c)) preempted any state fund designed to pay for
the "same types of expenses that may be paid by Superfund." 8
Under this interpretation, a state was prohibited from undertaking
a remedial action on its own if the cleanup were eventually to be
handled by the EPA under CERCLA, even if the federal government had not yet spent money at the site.
Congress responded to Hunt with SARA, removing the state
compensation proscription from CERCLA.5 9 The accompanying
conference report explained that the deletion "clarifie[d] that
States are not preempted from imposing taxes for purposes already
covered by CERCLA."6 0 Elsewhere the conference report states
that the new provision does not "restrict the right of a state to
undertake a clean-up or to recover the costs of the clean-up under
HR Rep No 962 at 249 (cited in note 44).
See note 3.
55 42 USC § 9604(c)(3)(C).
"42 USC § 9614(c) (removed in 1986 by SARA).
57 475 US 355 (1986).

" Id at 370.
Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613, 1652 (1986).

HR Rep No 962 at 225 (cited in note 44).
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State law or CERCLA. ' '6 1 Congress, therefore, recognized that
state Superfund projects could play an important adjunct role in
the cleanup of hazardous wastes.
Because SARA answered the fundamental questions about the
permissible scope of state Superfund laws, almost all states have
adopted such laws. 2 The statutes adopt many different approaches
to hazardous waste cleanup. Similar to CERCLA, some state laws
establish, a fund to pay for cleanups. New Jersey's Spill Fund,
which pre-dates CERCLA, is a good example of this approach. 3
Other states have cleanup programs that are more modest in scope.
Colorado's hazardous substances statute, for example, provides
that state authorities must respond to emergency spills and gives a
right of reimbursement to the Attorney General and private par61 Id at 248.
e Ala Code §§ 22-30A-1 to 22-30A-11 (1975 & Supp 1989); Alaska Stat §§ 46.08.005 et

seq (1987 & Supp 1989); Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 36-1851 et seq (West 1956 & Supp 1989); Ark
Stat Ann §§ 8-7-501 et seq (1987 & Supp 1989); Cal Health and Safety Code §§ 25300 et seq
(West 1984 & Supp 1989); 1989 Colo Rev Stat §§ 25-16-101 et seq, §§ 29-22-101 et seq;
Conn Gen Stat Ann §§ 22a-114 et seq, §§ 22a-748 et seq (West 1985 & Supp 1989); Fla Stat
§§ 403.141, 403.161, 403.703, 403.725, and 403.726 (1988); Off Code Ga Ann §§ 12-8-60 et seq
(Michie 1988 & Supp 1989); Ill Ann Stat ch 1112, §§ 1003, 1022.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988 &
Supp 1989); Ind Code Ann §§ 6-6-6.6-1 et seq, §§ 13-7-8.6-1 et seq (West 1983 & Supp
1989); Iowa Code Ann §§ 455B.423 et seq (West Supp 1989); Kan Stat Ann §§ 65-3430 et
seq (1985 & Supp 1988); Ky Rev Ann Stat §§ 224.868 et seq (1982 & Supp 1988); La Rev
Stat Ann §§ 30:2202 to 30:2206, §§ 30:2221 to 30:2226, §§ 30:2271 to 30:2280 (West 1988 &
Supp 1990); 38 Me Rev Stat Ann §§ 1319-B to 1319-K (1989 & Supp 1990); Md Health and
Environmental Code Ann §§ 7-201, 7-218 to 7-221, 7-266 (1982 & Supp 1986); Mass Ann
Laws ch 21E, §§ 1-13 (Michie/Law Co-op 1988); Mich Comp Laws Ann §§ 299.501 et seq
(West 1984 & Supp 1989); Minn Stat Ann §§ 115B.01 et seq (West 1987 & Supp 1990); Miss
Code Ann §§ 17-17-3 and 17-17-5 (Law Co-op Supp 1989); Mo Ann Stat § 260.350, §§
260.435 et seq, §§ 260.500 et seq (Vernon Supp 1989); Mont Code Ann §§ 75-10-701 et seq
(1987); Nev Rev Stat §§ 459.400 et seq, § 353.263 (1987 & Supp 1989); NH Rev Stat Ann §§
147-B:1-11 (Equity Supp 1989); NJ Stat Ann §§ 58:10-23.11 et seq (West 1982 & Supp
1989); NM Stat Ann §§ 74-4-3, 74-4-7, and 74-4-8 (1989); NY State Finance Law § 97-2, NY
Envir Conservation Law §§ 27-0900 et seq, 71-2723, 71-2725, 27-1301 to 27-1319, NY Public
Health Law §§ 1389-a to 1389-d (McKinney 1984 & Supp 1990); NC Gen Stat §§ 130A-290
(1986 & Supp 1989), 143-215 (1987); ND Cent Code §§ 23-31-01 to 23-31-03 (Supp 1989);
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3734 (Page 1988 & Supp 1989); 63 Okla Stat Ann §§ 1-2015 to 1-2021
(West 1984 & Supp 1990); Or Rev Stat §§ 466.005, 466.150, 466.155, 466.160, 466.200, and
466.205 (1989); 35 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6018 (Purdon Supp 1989); RI Gen Laws §§ 23-19.1-4
and 23-19.1-22 (1987 & Supp 1989); SC Code Ann §§ 44-56-20, 44-56-160, 44-56-170, 44-56180, 44-56-190, and 44-56-200 (Law Co-op 1985 & Supp 1989); Tenn Code Ann §§ 68-46-201
et seq (1983 & Supp 1989); Tex Water Code Ann §§ 26.261 et seq, §§ 26.301 to 26.307
(Vernon 1988 & Supp 1990); 10 Vt Stat Ann §§ 1251, 1263(a), 1265(a), 1265(d)(5), 1265(e),
1282, and 1283 (Equity 1984 & Supp 1989); Va Code §§ 32.1-177, 32.1-178, and 32.1-182
(1985 & Supp 1989); Wash Rev Code Ann §§ 70.105 et seq (West Supp 1989); W Va Code §§
20-5G-1 to 20-5G-6 (1989); Wis Stat Ann §§ 144.43, 144.441, 144.61, 144.62, and 144.76
(West 1989).
" NJ Stat Ann §§ 58:10-23.11 et seq.
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ties, 4 but does not set aside a large fund for cleaning up the kind
of long-standing dump sites covered by CERCLA. Almost all states
empower selected officials to initiate cleanup actions of one kind or
another, but most of these statutes are designed to take up where
CERCLA leaves off.
The history of CERCLA has been marked by a slowly increasing willingness on the part of the federal government to expand
state involvement in the CERCLA program,6 but always keeping
the states in a secondary role. While the newly revised National
Contingency Plan (which took effect April 9, 1990) is meant to establish a "partnership" between the federal and state governments,
the federal government has kept ultimate control of the program
for itself. For example, the EPA declined to delegate to the states
the power to select remedies for hazardous waste sites."' In addition, the EPA decided not to promulgate a rule that would have
allowed deferral of the listing of sites on the National Priorities
List based on the capability of states to respond. 17 This leaves
open the theoretical possibility that the EPA could interrupt a
state's cleanup activities and force it to abide by the provisions of
CERCLA.
Thus, the current balance of power under CERCLA heavily
favors the federal government over the states. The Supreme Court
recently confirmed this imbalance, stating that Congress legitimately used the commerce power to displace the states under
CERCLA.6 5 States can mount their own cleanup efforts under state
laws, but once the EPA becomes involved, the states play only a
secondary role. States suggest sites to be cleaned, assist in the
cleanup if the EPA allows them, and intervene in reimbursement
actions if the EPA ignores state standards in negotiating a consent
decree.6e In sum, CERCLA severely circumscribes the role of the
states in hazardous waste cleanup.

1989 Colo Rev Stat § 29-22-204.
" Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National Contingency Plan-More Detail and
More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envir L Repr 10222, 10242 (1990).
11 55 Fed Reg 8783 (1990). The EPA did not want the states to have the ability to
commit Superfund money without EPA oversight.
67 55 Fed Reg 8667 (1989). Such deferral exists for sites regulable under RCRA.
Starfield, 20 Envir L Repr at 10242 (cited in note 65).
" Union Gas, 109 S Ct at 2284-85.
" 42 USC §§ 9605(a)(8)(B), 9604(a), 9621(f)(2)(B).
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SCHEME

The Theory of Federalism

CERCLA makes the federal government responsible for cleaning up almost all of the serious hazardous waste sites in the country. As we have seen, thefederal government may enlist a state's
help in a number of secondary roles, but retains a large amount of
discretion regarding the extent of state involvement. Complaints
have arisen about the system's effectiveness in achieving its goals. 70
The theory and rationale for our system of federalism illuminate
some of the problems and suggest the need for more state control
under CERCLA.
Arguments made during the ratification period of the Constitution reveal the Framers' and ratifiers' understanding of the federal system as limited by concerns of state autonomy. For example,
James Madison wrote in Federalist 45: "The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of
the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of
the State."'' 1 Similarly, James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that "[wihatever object of government is confined
in its operation and effect, within the bounds of a particular state,
should be considered as belonging to the government of that
state. 17 2 Thus, matters whose effects did not extend beyond the
boundaries of a state, as hazardous waste cleanups often do not,
were considered primarily state matters.
The federal government's creation and centralization of a national program for cleaning up hazardous waste sites reflects a
twentieth-century trend toward increasing federal regulatory control.7 ' This shift dates back at least as far as the New Deal, when
"local measures [often] appear[ed] hopelessly inadequate,' 7 4 given
10 See, for example, Surveys and Investigations Staff, A Report to the Committee on
Appropriations, United States House of Representatives on the Status of the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program (March 1988). See also Environmental Protection Agency, Oversight of the Environmental ProtectionAgency's Management Review of
the Superfund Program (1989) (responding to criticism).
1 Federalist 45 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 288, 292-93
(Mentor, 1961).
71 2 Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Constitution 424 (2d ed 1836) (quoted in Raoul Berger, Federalism:The Founders' Design
71 (U Oklahoma, 1987)) (emphasis in original).
73 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv L
Rev 421, 422-25, 504-08 (1987).
7 Id at 505.
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the increasing economic interdependency of states. In addition,
states appeared to be "arenas for factional strife and parochialism,"7 5 unable to solve a number of pressing problems.
The original justifications for CERCLA reflect this New Deal
legacy. Throughout the 1970s, states were widely perceived as ineffectual in drafting and implementing meaningful environmental
regulation. Moreover, states were seen as reluctant, even uncooperative, partners with the federal government in implementing federal environmental programs.1 8 When the pressing need for hazardous waste cleanup became apparent, Congress assumed that the
7
national government should take a leading, even dominant, role.
After all, at the time of CERCLA's enactment, only a handful of
states had legislation that could even begin to address the
problem.
This pessimism about the states' ability to perform adequate
cleanups seems to persist within the federal government.7 8 Yet,
during the past decade, many states have gained expertise and
achieved successes of their own.7e These achievements are even
more notable given the powerful incentives under the current
scheme for states to conserve their resources and remain in the
background, letting the federal government shoulder the full burdens of hazardous waste cleanup.
B.

Federalism Applied to CERCLA
1.

Interstate coordination.

Many systems of environmental regulation are usefully and efficiently carried out at the federal level due to economies of scale
and scope. As one commentator has noted, "[c]ollection of data
and analysis of environmental problems, standard setting and (in
some instances) selection of control measures involve recurring,

75

Id at 425.

See Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1198 (cited in note 10).
The original § 9614(c), which led to the Hunt decision, was one manifestation of this
thinking. See text at notes 55-61.
73 See Freedman, 19 Envir L Repr at 10116 (cited in note 19). For example, the Office
of Technology Assessment views the states as unable to make a substantial independent
contribution to the cleanup. OTA, Superfund Strategy at 24-25 (cited in note 5).
79 See Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental Protection
Agency, State Participationin the Superfund Program: CERCLA Section 301(a)(1)(E)
Study, Final Report (1984); Carolyn L. Buchholz, Can a JurisdictionalShowdown Under
Superfund Be Avoided?, 19 Envir L Repr 10327 (1989).
71
"
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technically complex issues; such steps can often be taken far more
cheaply [] on the national level."' 0
National coordination, however, is unnecessary in the context
of CERCLA. The Superfund was created to facilitate the cleanup
of a large number of hazardous waste sites scattered throughout
the country. As noted earlier, these sites are not interconnected:
they are discrete and usually within the confines of a single state.8 ,
Moreover, as of October 17, 1989, the EPA cannot begin a remedial
action until the affected state guarantees that it will provide a federally-approved disposal facility for the removed substances;"2
thus, even waste disposal occurs within the affected state. Indeed,
the entire remedial action is a function that might normally be
thought of as within the police power of a state-the protection of
local public health.
Similarly, the National Priorities List does not perform a necessary or even very useful coordinating function at the federal
level. Some sites are on the National Priorities List simply because
each state is guaranteed at least one site on the List."' The rest of
the sites are chosen by means of the Hazard Ranking System, 4
whose underlying scores are based on subjective judgments by
evaluators, often state officials. Some evaluators use "realistic" assumptions, while others use "worst case scenarios."8 5 The Hazard
Ranking System has been changed several times, and it can be
manipulated to control the number of sites placed on the List."
Finally, the National Priorities List is somewhat arbitrary, having
evolved from an ad hoc, working draft of potential cleanup sites to
its current significance as an exclusive list of sites that will receive
87
remedial action.
Although the current system is not well-suited to carry out its
purportedly federal objectives, the Hazard Ranking System and
National Priorities List could be redesigned to achieve their intended goals.8 8 The EPA's monopoly on hazardous waste cleanup
creates other, more serious problems, however. Having only one lo80 Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1212 (cited in note 10).
81 See text at notes 3-4.
82 42 USC § 9604(c)(9).
83 42 USC § 9605(a)(8)(B).
40 CFR § 300, Appendix A (1989).
8 See Stever, 1 Law of Chemical Regulation § 6.06 at 6-72 (cited in note 14).
8 Sites do not come off of the List, however, without the state's concurrence. 42 USC §
9621(f)(1)(C).
"I See Stever, 1 Law of Chemical Regulation §6.06 at 6-71 (cited in note 14).
For example, eliminating the requirement that each state gets a site on the National
Priorities List and implementing uniform criteria in the Hazard Ranking System for judging
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cus of decisionmaking means that the progress of hazardous waste
cleanup is totally dependent on how quickly that one agency can
address the problem. In the early 1980s, when inaction in the EPA
hindered enforcement of CERCLA,s9 hazardous waste cleanup was
jeopardized across the entire country. Although Congress tried to
rectify that situation with SARA, the EPA still has begun less than
three hundred of an expected two thousand or more cleanups on
the National Priorities List.e° The current structure of CERCLA
effectively bottles up state resources while the EPA plods through
the National Priorities List. CERCLA puts all the national environmental cleanup "eggs" in one basket, thus increasing the risk
that no significant cleanups will occur. Absent a need for national
coordination, the authority to perform cleanups should be dispersed among the states.
2.

Political accountability and sensitivity to local concerns.

The EPA's monopoly on hazardous waste cleanup does not adequately respect the diversity of interests held by the affected
states. As Professor Michael McConnell states, "So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the
various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized
decisionmaking than by a single national authority." 91 The diversity of approaches taken by the states to the problem of hazardous
waste cleanup in their own statutes reflects different policy tradeoffs with respect to those cleanups. Congress's displacement of
state authority under CERCLA is especially puzzling when one
considers that local decisionmaking authority has been honored in
so many other federal environmental schemes, such as the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA 2

sites across the nation would improve the National Priorities List as a centralized source of
information about those sites needing the greatest attention.
69 See generally Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The
Case of Superfund, 1985 Duke L J 261, 276-87.
90 BNA Envir Daily 4 (October 31, 1989). Of course, CERCLA does not forbid states to
clean up sites on the National Priorities List, but as a practical matter states have little
incentive to devote their own resources to cleanups that CERCLA obligates the EPA (eventually) to perform.
91 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi L
Rev 1484, 1493 (1987).
92See John E. Bonine and Thomas 0. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection: Cases-Legislation-Policies320 (West, 1984); and Adam Babich, Coming to Grips
with Toxic Waste: The Need for Cooperative Federalism in the Superfund Program, 19
Envir L Repr 10009 (1989).
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From the beginning, CERCLA has required financial assistance from the states." As discussed earlier, many states responded to this requirement by creating their own "miniSuperfund" laws. Once enacted, states often used these statutes for
both CERCLA and non-CERCLA cleanups. Having been drawn
into the hazardous waste cleanup business by the federal government, these states have become increasingly interested in administering and implementing cleanup programs. 4
This emerging state interest has led to wasteful competititon
for control of cleanup efforts at individual sites. The Akzo case discussed earlier exemplifies this phenomenon. 5 Akzo involved a consent decree proposed by the EPA, which suggested one cleanup
method-w"soil flushing"-instead of the state's preferred remedy-incineration.9 6 Soil flushing is a cheaper remedy, but Michigan contended that the method would have uncertain consequences and that its use might violate state laws. 9 7 Thus, the state

sought to intervene in the federal action to challenge the proposed
consent decree and to require the EPA and the defendants to comply with state law.98 This is a striking example of a state and the
EPA fighting each other in the courts, with the state trying to
force the EPA to impose a stricter, costlier standard on the responsible parties.
CERCLA gives states the right to intervene when the remedial
action does not conform to state standards,9 but the statute does
not require that state standards be satisfied. These rules provide
no incentive for the EPA to take state concerns into account when
negotiating settlements under CERCLA; in practice, the EPA
often ignores state interests. For example, the EPA is currently engaged in consent decree negotiations concerning a site owned by
Champion International near Libby, Montana. Despite the state of
Montana's requests to participate, the EPA is conducting unilateral negotiations with Champion, limiting Montana to a "consultative role" that effectively "preclude[s it] from any subsequent decisionmaking role concerning activity conducted or results achieved
42 USC § 9604(c)(3)(C).
" The majority of state cleanup statutes were enacted after CERCLA. See statutes
cited in note 62.
95 719 F Supp at 571.
" Id at 574-76.
0 Id at 576.
93 Id at 577, 579.
" 42 USC § 9621(f)(2)(B).
9
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under the consent decree."100 Moreover, the Justice Department
has rejected the possibility of entering into a "memorandum of understanding," which would establish a method for resolving disputes between the federal and state governments over remedies.101
Instead, if Montana disagrees with the final negotiated terms, it
will be forced to intervene in the federal suit against the potentially responsible parties (as Michigan did in Akzo) and to plead
its case before a federal judge. 02 Such an outcome seems not only
wasteful of state and federal resources, but also contrary to fundamental principles of federalism.
Because CERCLA requires only token deference to state concerns, the EPA and the Justice Department are free to ignore or
"stiff arm" the states. 03 Changing the locus of decisionmaking
from the state to the federal level decreases political accountability
and public involvement, since the EPA is further removed from
the people than the state government. 04 SARA added some provisions for public comment and input at several stages of the negotiation process, but the EPA has only limited incentives to heed this
input. In summary, while CERCLA mandates a "substantial and
meaningful" role for the states, that guarantee is subverted by procedural rules that allow the federal government to ignore states'
interests.105
100See Buchholz, 19 Envir L Repr at 10330 (cited in note 79).

101 Id. The EPA and the state of Massachusetts entered into such an agreement in
Massachusetts v Adac Corp., No 89-0307-5 (D Mass 1989). See Buchholz, 19 Envir L Repr
at 10330 n 27 (cited in note 79).
101Buchholz, 19 Envir L Repr at 10330 (cited in note 79).
10" John C. Chambers, Jr. and Peter L. Gray, EPA and State Roles in RCRA and CERCLA, 4 Natural Resources and Envir 7, 42 (1989) (states cannot rely on what is in the Code
of Federal Regulations, because EPA often "stiff arms" the states).
104 See Office of Technology Assessment, Doe No OTA-ITE-362, Are We Cleaning Up?
10 Superfund Case Studies-Special Report 12 (1988) ("EPA is less responsive to community concerns about a remedy being impermanent than to interests which favor a lower cost
impermanent remedy.").
105 Another related problem concerns federally controlled facilities that pollute in violation of CERCLA. Frequently the United States Department of Defense is a potentially responsible party under CERCLA, but the states are usually powerless to respond if one part
of the Executive Branch (usually the Justice Department) wants to avoid penalizing another. See Babich, 19 Envir L Repr at 10009 (cited in note 92); and Colorado v United
States Department of the Army, 707 F Supp 1562 (D Colo 1989). Compare CERCLA to the
Clean Air Act, which permits states to force polluting federal facilities to comply with state
and local requirements. Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7418 (1982 & Supp 1989).
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As the foregoing discussion indicates, CERCLA is not working
as well as its drafters had hoped or intended. In thinking about
how CERCLA might be improved, it is important to recognize that
many aspects of the statute are worthwhile and effective. Like
many other environmental problems, hazardous waste cleanup
benefits from cooperation between states and the federal government; state governments vigorously protect local interests and tailor solutions to local concerns, while the federal government sets
national standards, provides funding and expertise, and tackles
multistate problems. Each government capitalizes on its strengths.
Consistent with these institutional capabilities, this Section proposes two ways to increase the states' role in initiation and implementation of hazardous waste cleanups.
A.

Return the Initiative to the States

Many of the other federal environmental statutes combine
uniform, federal standards with state implementation. 1 6 But CERCLA is just the opposite: the federal government bears the major
burden of implementation within a framework of federal and potentially applicable state laws. Most of the Superfund sites, however, are geographically within the borders of individual states and
do not generate externalities affecting other states. Therefore, the
problems of interstate effects and coordination-the traditional
province of the federal government-are generally not present in
hazardous waste cleanup. This suggests that the current degree of
centralization is unjustified and that the burden of implementation
could be more profitably borne by the states.
CERCLA should be amended so that its enforcement and implementation structure more closely resemble that of the Clean Air
Act. Under the proposed revision of CERCLA, federal law would
mandate a certain number of state-initiated cleanups of National
Priorities List sites to be completed within a certain length of
time.107 CERCLA would continue to impose liability on responsible
104See, for example, the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7410 (State Implementation Plans),
§ 7408 (National Ambient Air Quality Standards); RCRA, 42 USC §§ 6926, 6929, 2931,
6946-48, 6961, 6972, 6992f; and Clean Water Act, 33 USC §§ 1342, 1370 (1982 & 1989 Supp).
107 The EPA would continue to maintain the National Priorities List as an informational aid to the states and for its own use in oversight activities. On the other hand, Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies (RI/FS), which are the studies the EPA does to
determine the extent of the danger at a site and propose a remedy for that site, are probably
better handled at the state level because they are site-specific and because the state, not the
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parties for the past dumping of certain specified substances, as it
does now, but only the states would have statutory authority to
bring enforcement actions. Which sites to clean and which actions
to bring are decisions that should be left to the discretion of the
states.10 8 If a cleanup were beyond the expertise of a state, the
EPA would be allowed to assist the state in the cleanup, but only
at the state's request.
The revised CERCLA should also allow the EPA to maintain
an oversight role by requiring EPA approval of state remedial
plans.10 9 The EPA would assess the remedial plans against the National Contingency Plan, which would remain in effect and preempt state law to the extent that state standards were less stringent.11 0 But CERCLA should ensure that the National
Contingency Plan is focused on the cleanliness of sites, not on
preference of certain technological methods of cleanup. If the state
demonstrates to the EPA that a remedial action chosen by the
state will achieve the level of cleanliness required by the National
Contingency Plan by whatever means, then the EPA Administrator must approve it."'
Under the proposal, preemption of state standards that do not
meet certain minimal criteria furthers several policies. First, a uniform floor throughout the country would eliminate the so-called
"race to the bottom," the incentive for states to relax their cleanup
standards in an effort to encourage business development. Yet
above the minimum specified by federal law, states would be free
to make their own tradeoffs. Thus, the proposal preserves a substantial amount of state autonomy while ensuring that a minimum
level of hazardous waste cleanup will be achieved. Second, uniform
minimum standards reduce in part the transaction costs that
would result from a completely decentralized system; ex ante

federal government, will normally act on the RIMPS by cleaning up the site. With EPA permission, states are currently authorized to perform RI/FS in state-directed remedial actions.
See Freedman, 19 Envir L Repr at 10135 (cited in note 19).
105 This Comment does not address the extent to which there should be private rights
of action under CERCLA, either for injuries sustained or as a supplement to enforcement.
109 This is also similar to the Clean Air Act. See Bonine and McGarity, Law of Environmental Protection at 320 (cited in note 92).
110 Many states already require their hazardous waste cleanups to conform to the National Contingency Plan whenever possible, so the transition should not be costly or difficult. See, for example, NJ Rev Stat § 58:10 - 23.1If(a).
" This has a parallel in the Clean Air Act, in which the EPA Administrator must
approve State Implementation Plans if she finds that the Plan will comply with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. See 42 USC § 7410(a)(2); and Union Electric v EPA,
427 US 246 (1976).
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agreement on the standards will defuse some of the antagonism
between the states, the responsible parties, and the federal government.112 Third, preemption ensures that states pursue permanent
remedies, as required by the National Contingency Plan and
CERCLA. 113
In effect, CERCLA currently establishes a presumption that
the EPA will carry out the cleanup; generally, states may assume
the federal role only with the EPA's permission. The revised CERCLA reverses that presumption: states have primary responsibility
for cleanup, and the EPA may intervene only with the permission
of the affected state. The EPA retains the ability to become involved at the state's request in remedial actions because some
projects are too big or too complicated for individual states to handle alone. States may choose to enlist the aid of the federal government, which may have more expertise or resources. This potential
for federal action and the need for maintaining minimum federal
standards suggest that states should notify the EPA before undertaking cleanup actions. Even if states enlist the federal government
to clean most sites, the revised CERCLA is preferable to EPA centralization because of the political accountability and comity concerns discussed earlier.
Because states assume primary responsibility for cleanups
under the revised CERCLA, a state may take action either under
its own laws or under CERCLA. In either case, however, the primary source of funding should be from the states. Simply having a
large federal fund to finance state-led efforts would create other
problems associated with federalism. When the federal government
provides a common pool of funding for the states to use in
predominantly local projects, each state will be relieved from considering its own budgetary constraints and will demand more from
the federal fund than it would otherwise spend itself.11 4 The
Superfund should remain dedicated primarily to federal actions
(i.e., remedial actions performed by the EPA at the request of a
state).
This revised CERCLA returns a large measure of self-determination to the states in the cleanup of hazardous wastes. State governments are likely to be more responsive, and the EPA is too far
removed from the affected people in many instances to effectively
112 Recall the wasteful battles now taking place in the federal courts between state governments, the EPA, and the Justice Department. See Section HI.

I's 42 USC § 9621(b)(1).
114

See McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1496 (cited in note 91).
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meet the needs of a particular situation.1"15 Therefore, the proposed
revision responds to the major federalism objection under the current CERCLA scheme: intrastate matters could be resolved by local officials elected by the affected groups.
It may well be that in 1980, when CERCLA was passed, the
states were not prepared to assume the responsibility of cleaning
up the nation's hazardous waste sites, but the increasing interest
and involvement of states suggests that they now are. While the
federal government may have a certain comparative expertise, it
lacks sensitivity to local needs. The states, therefore, should assume primary responsibility for the implementation of hazardous
waste cleanups.
B.

Allow States to Sue for Injunctions in Federal Court

In addition to initiating hazardous waste cleanup, states
should have the right to sue polluters for federal injunctions under
CERCLA. As discussed in Section I, CERCLA currently allows
states to enforce only the provisions of existing consent decrees in
federal court.
Under this second proposed revision of CERCLA, states would
have the same power as the President to "secure such relief as may
be necessary to abate such danger or threat"1 16 in the federal
courts. This power to seek an injunction gives the states an additional weapon against sudden spills or emergencies. 117 Injunctions
are cheaper than government-sponsored cleanups in two ways." 8
First, the government cannot always expect to recover all of its
costs in an action for reimbursement because CERCLA provides
defenses (albeit limited), and because it sometimes proves impossible to establish which parties are responsible." 9 Second, the government does not have the same profit motive as private firms; private firms are probably in a better position to find the cheapest
ways of performing the cleanups.
Since the passage of CERCLA, the federal courts have construed the statute broadly in favor of allowing injunctive actions
for abatement to go forward. For example, one court, analyzing the
215 See Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 505 (cited in note 73) ("[I]t is no longer credible to
believe that federal agencies can serve as an outlet for democratic aspirations.").
118 42 USC § 9606(a).
" See text at note 45.
x. See generally Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 Harv L
Rev 584, 593-95 (1981).
I" See 42 USC § 9607(b).
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requirement of "imminent and substantial endangerment," held
that "endangerment" means only potential harm, and that "imminent" can include situations in which the harm will not occur for
several years. 120 Another court held that the endangerment requirement is met by a showing that there "may be risk of harm,"
and that the "substantial endangerment" need not be quantified.121 Moreover, the government need not satisfy the traditional
equitable requirement showing irreparable harm in suits for injunctions. 22 If the federal courts continue to interpret CERCLA
broadly for purposes of granting injunctions, states will have a very
powerful tool at their disposal.
CONCLUSION

Congress's decision to vest most of the decisionmaking and
implementation authority of the Superfund program in the federal
government makes CERCLA an oddity among federal environmental statutes. 23 Most major environmental legislation, including the
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA (the other half of
Congress's approach to the hazardous waste problem) involve the
states to a much greater extent than does CERCLA. Yet the rationales underlying those laws apply at least as well to CERCLA.
Two fundamental shifts in the structure and philosophy of
CERCLA should be enacted. First, control over the implementation of remedial actions under CERCLA should be given to the
states. The EPA could maintain an oversight and advisory role and
could intervene in a remedial action with the state's permission.
Shifting the major decisionmaking authority from the EPA to the
states enhances political accountability and better comports with
principles of federalism. Second, the states should be allowed to
enjoin polluters in federal court under CERCLA. This power complements increased state responsibility for implementation of the
program, and it should produce less costly solutions in many
cleanups.
As David Stockman said, the federal government "cannot do
everything"; 2 4 nor was it intended to do everything. In the context
of environmental regulation, self-determination and local control
over local matters are important principles. It is troublesome that
B.F. Goodrich v Murtha, 697 F Supp 89, 96-97 (D Conn 1988).
121United States v ConservationChemical Co., 619 F Supp 162, 194 (W D Miss 1985).
120

122Murtha, 697 F Supp at 96.
123

See Babich, 19 Envir L Repr at 10009-11 (cited in note 92).
note 1.

124 See
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states must wait for the EPA to undertake these vital cleanup
projects. Deferring to federalism concerns and the recent practical
expertise acquired by the states in environmental cleanups, Congress should empower the states to control the initiation and enforcement of these projects.

